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ANNUAL REPORT 2023
HAUT CONSEIL POUR LE CLIMAT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Human-induced climate change has had profound impacts on France in 2022, exceeding the current capacity for prevention and crisis management. The year 2022 was emblematic of the intensification of the effects of climate change, and illustrates the need to acknowledge the urgency of the situation and commit the resources required to intensify action on adaptation and decarbonisation in France, Europe and internationally. Emissions continue to decline in France in 2022, but at a rate that remains insufficient to achieve 2030 targets. The framework for public policy action on climate change is strengthening, but for so far it has not been accompanied by an overall economic policy sufficient to trigger the necessary acceleration. The adoption of the regulations in the European Union's Fit for 55 package must rapidly be translated into concrete measures and new sources of funding in both France and Europe. Adaptation must move on from the currently prevalent reactive mode to become transformative, based on knowledge of the consequences for France, including for seasons and extreme events. At a time when the proliferation of public policies at an international level is beginning to curb global emissions, France's response to climate change must be scaled up on the basis of its growing strategic framework for action. France must now systematise its operational implementation, commit the necessary resources and funding, support the most vulnerable in a spirit of a just transition, avoid maladaptation, and work to support the European dynamic and revive the international dynamic in the run-up to COP28.

THE YEAR 2022 WAS EXCEPTIONALLY HOT AND DRY IN FRANCE, WHICH HAD PROFOUND IMPACTS ON PEOPLE, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, INFRASTRUCTURES AND ECOSYSTEMS. PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO AVOID ALL THE CONSEQUENCES OF METEOROLOGICAL AND CLIMATIC EVENTS OF 2022, DESPITE THE EXCEPTIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT RESOURCES.

The year 2022 was emblematic of the intensification of the effects of climate change due to human activities in mainland France. A series of meteorological and climatic events had profound effects on ecosystems, individuals, infrastructures and economic activities, which required emergency measures and compensation.

- The year 2022 was exceptionally hot (record year, +2.9°C compared to 1900-1930 according to Météo-France data) and dry (precipitation deficit of 25% compared to 1991-2020).
- The combination of low rainfall and high temperatures led to exceptional surface soil drought over three-quarters of mainland France from July to September 2022. Groundwater replenishment was limited by low levels of rainfall.
- Agricultural production has seen yields fall by 10-30% in some sectors, with forage production down 30% on the five-year average.
- Hydroelectric production was 20% lower in 2022 than the 2015-2019 average.
- The early and prolonged drying up of ditches and wetlands on the Atlantic seaboard has had consequences for biodiversity, leading to low or abnormal reproduction of water fowl and a virtual absence of reproduction of certain amphibian species.

Prevention and crisis management measures were unable to avoid all the consequences of the meteorological and climatic events of 2022.

- Drinking water supplies came under severe strain in more than 2,000 municipalities, 7 of which experienced a total interruption of service for a minimum of several days in mainland France. This underscores the limits of the public water management system, in spite of being revised by the decree of 24 June 2021 and an implementation guide in June 2022.

- Damages to buildings caused by dry soil has given rise to more than 8,000 requests from municipalities for the effects of shrinkage-swelling of clays to be recognised as a "natural disaster" in 2022. The estimated cost of €2.9 billion to insurers is at the limit of sustainability, according to the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance.

- National means of fighting vegetation fires were employed on more than 7,800 fires and 72,000 hectares burned in 2022. Capacity has been reached, and foreign resources had to be deployed as reinforcements.

- Despite a structured and efficient health management system in place since 2004, summer heatwaves caused more than 2,816 excess deaths in 2022. Heatwaves all result in a significant increase in deaths, totalling more than 10,500 over the last 8 summers.

- 65 autochthonous cases of dengue fever spread through 9 foci of transmission have been identified in France in the first ten months of 2022, the largest dengue fever "hot spot" ever documented in Europe. The tiger mosquito, which spreads the disease, was present in 72 French departments in 2022, with more than 40% of the population being exposed to this mosquito in half of them.

Climatic factors generating impacts will continue to intensify with the level of global warming. For mainland France and Western Europe, this implies an increase in the frequency, intensity and duration of heatwaves and agricultural droughts, an increase in extreme hot and dry conditions (namely weather conditions conducive to fires), an intensification of extreme precipitation, a decrease in annual precipitation in the Mediterranean region, a retreat of snow cover and glaciers, and a decrease in river flows (outside of winter).

- The record temperature for 2022 corresponds to the average temperature in France by 2050-2060 for a level of global warming reaching 2°C.

- Additional and coherent adaptation measures that take the future intensification of multiple climatic factors generating impacts into account are essential to strengthen resilience and avoid an increase in impacts, loss, damage and recurrent emergency management costs.

- The decline in forest productivity, increase in tree mortality and fire damage, and hydric stress on ecosystems limit the potential of carbon sinks, which must be reviewed as part of the carbon budgets specified in the SNBC and for the Net Zero target of 2050.

- Year 2022, whose consequences have been clear for society and ecosystems, could serve as a reference point for identifying, specifying and quantifying specific vulnerabilities. It could also be used to determine investments and measures to be taken in the development of France's climate change adaptation path and associated strategy.

GIVEN THAT FRANCE IS PARTICULARLY EXPOSED TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL WARMING, ADAPTATION MUST SHIFT FROM THE CURRENTLY PREVAILING REACTIVE MODE TO BECOME TRANSFORMATIVE, BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR FRANCE, INCLUDING DURING EXTREME SEASONS AND YEARS.

- France is particularly exposed to the consequences of global warming, but is not ready to handle it. Adaptation must shift from the currently prevailing reactive mode to become transformative, anticipating future changes over multiple time frames: years, seasons and shorter extreme events.

- The average warming of +1.9°C in France over the last decade (2013-2022) is higher than global warming overall +1.15°C (1.00°C - 1.25°C) over the same period. This increase, both in France and globally, is attributable to human activities. At today's global warming level, there is approximately a 10% chance that a year warmer than 2022 will occur in France.

- Climate projections show that a warming of nearly 2.0°C by 2030, with a high range of 2.3°C, is practically unavoidable for France (on average over 20 years), with extreme years approaching 3°C (as in 2022) becoming increasingly frequent, and set to intensify further.

- On the basis of scenarios that are consistent with public policies currently being implemented worldwide, average global warming in France is projected to be approximately 4°C by the end of the century, on which natural variability must be superimposed to anticipate the occurrence of extreme years and events. The extent of global warming at 2050 and beyond will depend on future global greenhouse gas emissions.

- The global and regional climate response to the emissions trajectory implied by the extrapolation of public mitigation policies currently implemented worldwide can serve as a frame of reference for determining the minimum adaptation needs. This is consistent with the reference framework announced by the government for France, i.e. 4°C in France by 2100, provided that multiple additional risks are taken into account: natural variability superimposed on trends, consequences in the event of a reversal of climate policies at a global level, and uncertainties associated with limited knowledge about the response of the climate and the carbon cycle, by exploring risks that are unknown or of low probability of occurrence but could potentially have major impact.

- A transformational adaptation strategy, which is not very visible today, requires the inclusion in current frames of reference of foreseeable characteristics of future events with different probabilities of occurrence, including those of low probability, but whose potential impacts would be major. This should also serve to scale investments and services, risk zoning and the development of infrastructures and existing uses, and to anticipate capacity disruptions in sensitive areas such as water supply. The development of general and specialised climate services is intended to facilitate transformational adaptation, but adaptation services must be designed for each sector, such as agriculture, forestry, health and infrastructure, and in support of integrated approaches (e.g. water management, land-use planning, etc.).

- It is likely that the current configuration of the insurance system in France will not be sustainable, given the increase in claims in recent decades and the limits of the shared sustainability of certain risks.

EMISSIONS CONTINUE TO DECLINE IN FRANCE IN 2022, BUT AT A PACE THAT REMAINS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET 2030 TARGETS. THE SECOND CARBON BUDGET IS LIKELY TO BE EXCEEDED OVER THE 2019-2022 PERIOD WHEN THE LOW ABSORPTION OF CARBON SINKS IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, ALTHOUGH IT IS RESPECTED FOR GROSS EMISSIONS.

- Greenhouse gas emissions in France decreased by 2.7% in 2022 compared to 2021, to reach 403.8 $MtCO_2e$, i.e. 25% below their 1990 level, according to provisional data. This drop of 11.0 $MtCO_2e$ for gross emissions in 2022 (excluding carbon sinks from land use, land-use change and the forestry (LULUCF) sector) is higher than the average annual decline of 8.1 $MtCO_2e$ observed over the 2019-2021 period, as well as that of 6.7 $MtCO_2e$ observed over the 2011-2021 period. The drop in GHG emissions in 2022 is the result of sharp declines in the building and industry sectors, partially offset by increases in the energy transformation and transport sectors. It is partly the result of economic factors (in particular a mild winter, reducing heating needs), but also of energy-saving measures in response to the rise in energy prices and to the government's energy-saving plan.

  - For net emissions, the indicative annual carbon budget for the 2019-2022 period of the SNBC 2 is likely to be exceeded, due to the low absorption by carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector. For gross emissions (excluding LULUCF), the indicative annual carbon budget has been respected every year over the 2019-2022 period, according to provisional data. The indicative average levels have been exceeded in the industrial, LULUCF and waste sectors, while the transport sector has met its budget, but mainly for external reasons (consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic).

  - France's gross emissions reduction rate needs to nearly double if it is to meet the targets set out in the European Fit for 55 legislative package by 2030, and the carbon sink in the LULUCF sector needs to substantially increase. The average annual decline of 9.1 $MtCO_2e$ over the 2019-2022 period (provisional data) is weaker than that of 12 $MtCO_2e$ expected in the SNBC 2 over the 2023-2030 period, and remains far from the 17 $MtCO_2e$ necessary to achieve the objectives of the Fit for 55 European legislative package.

- The rate of decline in emissions over the recent period is insufficient to achieve the Fit for 55 objectives by 2030 in all sectors, except in the building sector. Depending on the scenario to be determined by the government to share efforts amongst sectors, the emission reduction rate must be multiplied by a factor of 3.5 to 5 for the transport and energy sectors, a factor of 1.25 to 3.5 for agriculture, 1.4 to 1.6 for industry, and 1.6 to 1.9 for waste. For buildings, it could be multiplied by a factor of 1.2 or reduced, taking into account the influence of meteorological variations in recent years on emissions, which reflects the scope for action in the current indicative carbon budget for this sector.

- Fast-acting and in-depth corrective actions are needed for structural transformations that are not advancing at the pace expected to align with the SNBC. The consumption of combustion-powered vehicles is increasing due to the growing weight of cars, and the electrification of light commercial vehicles and heavy goods vehicles is being rolled out too slowly. Energy consumption in buildings is decreasing too slowly, and the increase in the production of electrical renewable energies is three times too slow. Forest-based carbon sinks are declining due to increased mortality and reduced tree growth. Of the 34 indicators examined herein, only three are progressing significantly faster than expected for non-cyclical reasons: the increase in the area of protein crops in agricultural crops, the production of energy from thermal renewables and waste in residential buildings, and the use of low-carbon heat in tertiary buildings.

THE FRENCH FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION AS REGARDS PUBLIC CLIMATE POLICIES IS STRENGTHENING, WITH NUMEROUS STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS THAT MOBILISE STAKEHOLDERS. IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN OVERALL ECONOMIC POLICY SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER THE CHANGES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE CLIMATE OBJECTIVES.

- This year, the High Council for the Climate is presenting its new method for evaluating public action, which will eventually enable it to examine in detail the progress made in implementing public climate policies. This evaluation method includes an examination of trends and progress indicators selected for each sub-sector, and an assessment of public policies on the basis of five essential criteria for achieving France's climate objectives: strategy, economic policy, barriers and enablers, adaptation, and just transition. This method is being applied in a reduced form this year, with particular attention paid to the existence and form of the public policy framework, and an examination of the implementation of policies focused on specific sectors or aspects.

- An overall approach is underway, with many strategic documents covering most sectors, but their consistency and alignment with climate objectives are not guaranteed. The strategic documents are not all calibrated to the level necessary to achieve the 2030 objectives of the Fit for 55, written into European climate law since June 2021. No strategic document guides the overall actions in France, apart from the SNBC 2, which is not an operational document.

  - Existing plans are generally well framed, define priorities and actions, and mobilise various stakeholders, but monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are often incomplete, with notable shortcomings in planned operational mechanisms, including the designation of pilots and the time frame.

  - Some strategies are not very operational or are fragmented, particularly as regards to the decarbonisation of sub-sectors such as private car use, aviation, trade-offs on the electricity and energy mix after 2028, district heating, livestock farming, and the wood and forestry industries.

- The economic policy must be transformed in order to trigger the changes needed to achieve climate objectives, which include budget, fiscal, trade, industrial and employment policies. The economic policy must make it possible to identify how the annual public expenditure allocated to the transition will be mobilised, which must increase rapidly to reach an additional €30 billion in 2030.

- Direct climate-friendly spending in the 2023 budget bill increases if renewables support is excluded, but decreases when taking into account the lower support spending for renewables due to high electricity prices. Unfavourable climate expenditure has risen sharply in 2022 as a result of the tariff shield, which represents €80 billion in cumulative public expenditure over the 2021-2023 period, of which €43 billion is forecast for 2023, while tax loopholes identified in the green budget are increasing slightly, exceeding €10 billion, and other tax measures that are harmful to climate policies total at least an additional €6.3 billion. Fossil fuel taxation varies greatly according to sector and use; this has a significant effect on emissions and public finances, but without sufficient justification or evaluation, and little visibility on how it will evolve in line with climate objectives.

- This year's in-depth examination of economic policies for private car and housing sub-sectors highlights the existence of packages of measures, but with incentives and financial resources that are insufficiently aligned with the changes needed to achieve long-term objectives.

- The barriers and enablers making it possible to accelerate the transition, or on the contrary, to slow it down (infrastructure, training, etc.) are generally identified, but many are addressed with specific measures only. This observation highlights

a lack of systematisation of public action, leading to major risks of blockages at the level of multiple fundamental levers. Notable shortcomings are as follows:

  - Few measures have been taken to control demand, particularly in the transport and building sectors.

  - Accompanying measures for farmers and the development of skills in the building sector are still sources of stumbling blocks.

- The question of the contribution of adaptation to respecting carbon budgets is not explicit in the existing framework, except partially for agriculture and forestry, even though the general principle of no increase in emissions has been present in the national adaptation strategy since 2006.

- An examination of climate policies from the point of view of the just transition for the sub-sectors of private vehicles and housing indicates that these policies will weigh more heavily on low-income households, despite efforts made to offset regressive effects due to the limits in terms of inadequate supply and the ability of households to manage such inadequacy. This additional burden comes on top of high inflation.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT FOR ECOLOGICAL PLANNING MARKS AN IMPORTANT STEP THAT MUST BE REINFORCED, WHILE DECISIONS PERTAINING THE FIVE-YEAR ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLANNING LAW (LPEC), WHICH WILL STRUCTURE FRANCE'S CLIMATE ACTION, ARE STILL AWAITED.

- The Energy and Climate Planning Law (LPEC), reviewed every five years, must set France's new climate objectives to be consistent with the objectives of the European Union (EU) and its international commitments. Its revision should make it possible to strengthen the legal scope of France's commitments, namely the caps on carbon budgets - which must not be raised even if the targets are not met, a more realistic consideration of carbon sinks, integration of the carbon footprint and international transport and the inclusion of an explicit target for reducing methane emissions.

- The French Strategy for Energy and Climate (SFEC) must be adopted quickly, and broken down for each sector and region. It must also specify France's contribution to the commitment to reduce global methane emissions by 30% by 2030. The SFEC must be able to guide government decisions and to encourage climate action.

- The government's ecological planning has been coordinated since July 2022 by the Secretariat General for Ecological Planning (SGPE) under the authority of the Prime Minister. While this is an important step, the SGPE still needs to build up strength and demonstrate its ability to put the SFEC into action. The intervention of the SGPE must be articulated with other governmental climate and environmental projects, be provided with the means, and ensure that the various actors are given clear visibility of the paths to be followed.

- The existing progress indicators provide a relatively comprehensive overview of the transition, but do not allow a full assessment of the alignment with the SNBC plan to be carried out. More than half of sectoral sub-orientations do not have an associated indicator, and very few targets are defined to verify trajectories over the periods of the carbon budgets at both national and sectoral levels. Many indicators are not associated with an existing database, or are not updated regularly. SNBC 2 indicators are rarely included in other State works and documents. A systematic approach is needed to improve transition monitoring.

DESPITE THE MANY STRUCTURAL MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN ALL EMITTING SECTORS, THE PACE OF DECARBONISATION AND PROGRESS INDICATORS HIGHLIGHT A NUMBER OF BLOCKAGES. THE OPERATIONAL AND SYSTEMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROGRAMMED ACTION PLANS, WITH CORRESPONDING RESSOURCES, IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CLIMATE OBJECTIVES.

- The transport sector will see its emissions increase in 2022 (+2.3%) in line with its post-Covid-19 rebound, exceeding the indicative annual threshold of the SNBC 2. Transport emissions remain 2.9% below their 2019 level. Multiple external effects (lockdowns and the economic crisis) have helped to reduce transport emissions since 2019, although this does not mean that sufficient structural policies have been put in place.
  - Several strategic documents and roadmaps have been published, but the strategy for decarbonising private cars, which is essential to achieving the sector's decarbonisation objectives, is fragmented.
  - The regulatory and financial framework has evolved positively within the European framework. The maintenance of aid for the acquisition of electric cars and the reinforcement of the automobile surcharge at the French level support these objectives, but do not guarantee them. Current aids and incentives do not sufficiently steer production towards small, light and more affordable vehicles.
  - Policies supporting the acquisition of low carbon-emitting cars remain exclusionary and worsen inequalities, despite recent improvements.
- The agriculture sector will see its emissions decrease in 2021 (-1.7%, latest year available), continuing the trend observed in recent years. The drop in emissions is partly the result of the reduction in the size of cattle herds due to difficult socio-economic conditions in the sector, rather than a concerted strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
  - The government's choices regarding the distribution of effort amongst sectors will have a major impact on the level of increase in the agriculture sector's targets for 2030. The decline already observed in carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector will mean that the agricultural sector will have to make additional efforts to reduce emissions and/or increase carbon storage in soils.
  - The further reduction in the sector's emissions expected pursuant to Fit for 55 will require a strengthening of the national strategic plan in 2024 and a strong commitment to climate change adaptation, mitigation and carbon storage in agricultural soils as part of the subsequent law on the orientation and future of agriculture (LOAA).
  - Efforts are devoted to optimising technical enablers and accelerating innovation, but do not offer general accompanying support for farmers in the transition, leading to low structural potential for these measures.
  - Food, climate and nutrition policies must be better articulated. Measures concerning the reduction of emissions from livestock farming must be accompanied by measures on food demand and supply in order to prevent them from being weakened by imports of meat from the industry, mass distribution and restaurants.
- The industrial sector sees its emissions decrease in 2022 (-6.4%), continuing a structural decline that has slowed down in recent years and caused the sector to exceed its indicative annual SNBC 2 ceiling. The reduction plan and measures taken to deal with rising energy prices have contributed to the reduction of emissions in this sector in 2022.
  - The strategy for industrial decarbonisation has recently evolved to focus on the 50 most emitting sites, with support for companies encouraging decarbonisation. Sectoral roadmaps and strategies by site must be consistent and articulated.

- Decarbonisation technologies are financially supported around the industry decarbonisation acceleration strategy. The supply of strategic resources is identified, but has limited measures. Needs related to the development of skills present major challenges.

- The building sector sees its emissions decrease in 2022 (-14.7%). The weather-adjusted decline is 5.4%, and can be explained by the energy-saving plan and the rise in energy prices.

  - The policies implemented are not helping to trigger a sufficient number of high-performance, in-depth renovations. A number of improvements in 2023 have made it easier to carry out in-depth renovations, but this has not yet been sufficiently significant. Funding for in-depth renovations remains insufficient, both in terms of amounts and visibility.

  - Market organisation and economic parameters are lacking, in particular as regards the structure of supply. The sector faces a problem with the availability of people with the skills and qualifications needed to carry out in-depth renovations.

- The energy sector sees its emissions increase in 2022 (+4.9%) as a result of greater use of gas to compensate for the reduction in nuclear production due to the unscheduled unavailability of part of the fleet, and hydroelectric production, due to exceptionally hot and dry weather conditions and poor snow cover in the mountains.

  - The rate of emission reductions is slower than expected in SNBC 2. Progress indicators show a delay compared to the pace expected in SNBC 2 for the decline in the consumption of fossil fuels to produce electricity, the increase in the production of renewable electricity, and the production of biomethane.

  - The Multiannual Energy Program (PPE) provides the overall strategic vision of the sector, but is not an operational document and lacks clarity on the strategy and trajectory of the electricity and energy mix after 2028.

  - An operational approach is necessary, particularly to control demand through reduced use and efficiency, to anticipate changes in demand over the coming years by type of end energy, and build and develop sector policy.

  - Electricity production infrastructures have shown their fragility in recent years. The needs for flexibility of electrical transmission and distribution networks must evolve with the evolution of the electricity mix. Skills and training are covered by some measures and initiatives, but without ensuring that the right level will be reached.

- The amount of carbon stored by French carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector decreased in 2021 (-21%), while the spring drought in 2022 and summer fires will have contributed to the deterioration of forest carbon stocks over the last year (data not yet available). The decline in carbon storage in 2021 is concentrated in forests, and reinforced by the increase in emissions linked to land use and land conversion.

  - The amount of carbon stored by the LULUCF sector over the 2019-2021 period is less than half of that expected by SNBC 2 for the period. Carbon sinks in forests have fallen sharply over the recent period due both to the increase in tree mortality and the decrease in forest productivity, which are larger than anticipated in SNBC 2.

  - Given the extent of the damage, large-scale and long-term action will be needed to regenerate the forest, with greater of long-lived wood products, particularly timber, which will require strong incentives and control, particularly over the next ten years, of the volumes of short-lived products, particularly wood energy (primary biomass).

  - Land use and reclamation are mainly covered by the measures implemented to meet the zero net objective for land conversion (“Zéro artificialisation nette”), but this is not backed up by an operational strategy. Adaptation and mitigation are treated in synergy in the SNBC, particularly as regards carbon sinks that are directly dependent on forest resilience.

GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CONTINUE TO INCREASE, BUT AT A SLOWER RATE, DUE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICIES. COP27 DID NOT ENABLE PROGRESS ON COUNTRIES' EMISSION REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, WHILE INTERNATIONAL REPORTING ON THE ACTIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS IS TOO WEAK TO ENSURE THEIR QUALITY. STRONGER LEADERSHIP IS NEEDED TO REVIVE INTERNATIONAL MOMENTUM AHEAD OF COP28.

- At least 18 countries, including France, have seen their emissions decline for a decade or more. These trends are attributed to the results of climate policies and changes in the economic structure leading to the decarbonisation of energy systems, gains in energy efficiency, reduction in energy demand, and to a slowdown in net deforestation, but with relatively few policies in other areas of the LULUCF sector. These downward trends are also confirmed by the countries' carbon footprint. More than 3,145 climate laws are in place worldwide, which have prevented the emission of several billion tonnes of CO_2 equivalent per year.

- Despite recent advances, if not reinforced, current global public policies would lead to an estimated global warming of 3.2°C by 2100, with a range of uncertainty associated with policy developments beyond 2030 of between 2.2°C and 3.5°C. Taking the whole range of uncertainty about climate response into account, which is added to these values, the possibility of global warming of more than 4.0°C still cannot be ruled out.

- Recent advances are not sufficient to guarantee the achievement of current commitments in most countries, and must be reinforced by new actions. The advances to be highlighted include Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP) with multiple developing countries and new financing, particularly in the United States.

- Enhanced commitments for 2030 are necessary in order to limit global warming below 2°C and as close as possible to 1.5°C, in order to contain the intensification of serious climate risks. Global greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced by more than 20% in 2030 and 45% in 2040 compared with their 2019 levels to be in line with a trajectory that will limit global warming to well below 2°C, and by 43% and 69% in the same time frames to limit global warming to 1.5°C (with more than a 50/50 chance of success).

- Countries' Net Zero commitments come with weak constraints, and many lack credibility, which limit their reach. Progress on the implementation and financing of actions is necessary, as well as the clarification and strengthening of commitments for 2030 and 2050.

- COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh did not enable progress on commitments to reduction emissions, but it helped to make progress on the implementation of the Paris agreement regarding the transformation of financial flows, while, for the first time, established a fund for loss and damage at the request of developing countries. The cross-cutting issues of biodiversity and climate are highlighted by COP27, and reinforced by the 2023 Kunming-Montreal agreement. A new cycle of national contributions must be enabled to respond to the insufficient results of the global stocktake ahead of COP28 in December 2023, in order to revive international momentum.

- The weakness of European and international reporting on the commitments made by non-state actors (companies, investors, cities, regions) does not ensure the quality and utility of these commitments, and undermines climate action measure to respond to these deficiencies were proposed at COP27 by the high-level expert group on "the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities", launched at the request of the United Nations Secretary General. These recommendations should be implemented in Europe and within French borders, with the support of France. In addition, apart from the commitments expressed in the Paris Agreement, there is little follow-up to the sectoral commitments made by countries, thus they have little credibility, which undermines the international COP process.

MOST OF THE REGULATORY TEXTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FIT FOR 55 PACKAGE ARE FORMALLY ADOPTED, AND WILL STRUCTURE EUROPEAN CLIMATE ACTION. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL MECHANISMS THAT ACCOMPANY THEM ARE PROGRESSING AT A PACE THAT REMAINS HARD TO RECONCILE WITH ACHIEVING THE ENHANCED CLIMATE OBJECTIVES FOR 2030 IN 7 YEARS. FRANCE MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE AMBITION OF EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICIES AND THEIR OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION.

- The European Union (EU) Fit for 55 package, which defines the implementation of the European climate law, has formally adopted the majority of its regulatory texts. These texts and their accompanying plans explain how the EU proposes to achieve its objective of reducing EU net emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990, an objective written into European law since 30 June 2021. Despite these positive developments, the pace of change in policies and measures by Member States and by Europe, and their operational implementation, is hard to reconcile with the pace needed to achieve the enhanced climate objectives for 2030 - 7 years from now, except for the objectives of accelerating the deployment of renewable energies directly supported by the REpowerEU plan.

- The EU's climate policy supports France's efforts to reduce carbon emissions, while also imposing higher targets for 2030 that require national policy reinforcement. An investment plan is necessary in order to ensure the corresponding financial needs are met. The enabling effects of the Emissions Trading System (ETS), the preferred instrument of the EU, will likely be less pronounced in France than in the rest of the EU.

- The response of the EU and its Member States to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had many structural implications for the achievement of climate targets. The energy shields put in place have created favourable price signals for the consumption of fossil fuels. Although the immediate consequences have caused a drop in energy demand and associated emissions, the risks of lock-in effects need to be managed as regards to investments linked to increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the development of new commercial relations with fossil oil and gas-producing countries.

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